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This article describes how the narrative construct is used in the Power Threat 
Meaning Framework to refer to personal narratives, cultural narratives and as a meta-
theoretical language, synthesizing a range of different theoretical perspectives. It 
identifies ways in which this approach to narrative may differ from its use in a 
number of therapeutic traditions.  Focusing on medicalization and drawing on the 
concepts of ideological power, framing, filtering and gatekeeping, it discusses the 
processes which facilitate the dominance of a medical frame in the public 
conversation about mental health, proposing that such dominance is an example of 
hermeneutical injustice.  The article concludes, firstly, by suggesting some practices 
which therapists and other professionals could use to broaden and contextualize 
therapy conversations and, secondly, by making some proposals for how the public 
conversation about mental health could be re-balanced. 
 
Approach to narrative in the Power Threat Meaning Framework  
This special issue includes an article on each of the two aspects in the ‘Meaning and 
narrative’ chapter of the main Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF) document 
(Johnstone & Boyle, 2018).  John Cromby’s article (this issue) discusses the different 
facets of meaning:  language; feeling; culture; materiality; habit; and memory.  The 
present article focuses on one of the most pervasive sources of linguistic meaning – 
narrative.   
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The notion of narrative is used in three ways within the PTMF:   
• As personal narratives which are those which people construct about 
themselves (e.g. to understand their distress or troubling conduct) 
• As cultural narratives which are the frameworks of values and meaning 
conveyed within culture which shape how we see and experience the world  
• As a meta-theoretical language for the PTM conceptual framework in order to 
synthesize a range of different theoretical perspectives. These perspectives are 
based on the recognition that there is a relationship between narratives and 
circumstances, including other sources of meaning (Cromby, this issue) and 
social structures and power relations (Pilgrim, this issue)  
 
Within the PTMF, distress and conduct which troubles others, are seen as a legacy of 
threat responses developed in response to adversities in life, the occurrence of which 
reflect the negative operations of power in society. Since the framework was a 
response to the limitations of current conceptualisations (e.g. causal models) it was 
important to find a way of presenting the PTMF in a manner which could be 
understood by a range of different audiences like users and survivors of psychiatry, 
researchers, therapists and the general public.  Following the “narrative turn” of the 
late twentieth century, the narrative construct was seen as able to fulfill each of these 
functions. 
 
Definitions of narrative can be overly constraining and normative and so the PTMF 
adopted a deliberately broad definition.  Following Squire et al.’s (2014) approach, 
narrative was viewed as a set of signs (e.g. writing, sounds, images and so on) where 
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meaning is produced by movement between those signs, for example between the 
words of a written narrative or between images in a film.  Thus, within the PTMF, 
narrative is not seen simply as a cognitive representation of an internal state or trait.  
This broad approach was useful in conveying the inter-relatedness of the individual 
and culture and this was accomplished in the PTMF in three key ways.  Firstly, it 
emphasized that personal narratives are shaped by cultural narratives through 
processes of learning and internalization.  Thus, from an early age our memories and 
self-narratives are shaped within interpersonal relationships with caregivers and 
others.  As Vygotsky’s studies demonstrated, private thought emerges, 
developmentally, through the internalizaton of external language.  So, too, we 
gradually learn and internalize those narratives which are made available to us and 
which carry the values of the surrounding culture (e.g. about distress, gender roles 
etc).  Secondly, these narratives deploy dominant frames and metaphors (e.g. 
psychological distress is like being medically ill) and provide an array of potential 
positions in which we can locate ourselves and others (Davies & Harré, 1990).  A 
medically framed narrative makes available certain objects (e.g. illness and treatment) 
and certain roles or positions (e.g. patient and doctor).  However, we can also be 
positioned by others and, indeed, we can be positioned by narratives themselves since 
each narrative is both constructive and constrictive, opening up some ways of 
constructing understandings of reality and closing down others.  Thirdly, since the 
elements from which we construct personal narratives are drawn from wider culture, 
then how we conceptualize distress and troubling conduct – what Harry Stack 
Sullivan referred to as “problems in living” -- will depend on what narratives are 
available in our culture and this, in turn is shaped by ideological power (Boyle, this 
issue). Different cultural narratives about troubled and troubling conduct compete, 
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different institutions promote particular narratives and their relative influence changes 
in respond to societal change.  
 
Within the PTMF, cultural narratives are seen as encoding a set of social norms and 
we are regularly exhorted to compare both ourselves and others to these norms. 
Problems in living are examples of forms of social norm transgression, leading both 
to internalized shame (as we fail to meet these idealized norms) and prejudice and 
discrimination from others (Read & Harper, this issue).   
 
How the use of narrative in the PTMF might differ from its use by therapeutic 
traditions  
The notion of narrative is likely to be familiar to readers of this journal including 
those influenced by narrative psychology (Bruner, 1991; Sarbin, 1986) personal 
construct theory and cognitive constructivist traditions (e.g. Neimeyer & Winter, 
2007), social constructionism (Gergen, 2015) and those approaches, like Narrative 
Therapy (e.g. White & Epston, 1990), influenced by post-Structuralism. 
 
The PTMF, as Cromby (this issue) notes, was influenced by fourteen different 
theoretical perspectives:  cognitive approaches; radical behaviorism; interpretative 
and hermeneutic approaches; constructivism; social constructionism; critical realism; 
process philosophy; systemic approaches; spiritual perspectives; liberation and social 
justice approaches; New Social Movements like the psychiatric survivor movement; 
feminist perspectives; indigenous psychology; and narrative approaches.   
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There are obviously important ontological and epistemological differences between 
these different perspectives. However, although each approach has some limitations 
and there are obviously areas of overlap and disagreement, taken together: 
 
they offer an extremely rich resource of ideas, theory, research and practice 
specifically focused on human behavior and experience, with some more than 
others incorporating the social and political contexts and power relations 
within which these develop.  Johnstone and Boyle (2018, p.67) 
 
Those working in the field of psychotherapy have advocated using the narrative 
metaphor so that therapists from different traditions can communicate with each other 
(e.g. Angus & McLeod, 2004).  Although the Framework may be used in therapeutic 
settings, it is not, strictly speaking, a therapeutic document or tradition.  However, we, 
similarly, found that the metaphor provided a means of “pulling together the 
conceptual threads” of the 14 different conceptual perspectives (Johnstone & Boyle, 
2018, p.66).  
 
Since therapeutic schools are often influenced by a dominant philosophical tradition, 
the pluralistic theoretical heritage of the PTMF is likely to lead to some differences 
with them.  Cromby observes, for example, that, in the PTMF, meaning is seen as 
having a number of constitutive aspects.  Another potential difference concerns the 
use of medicalizing language.  Many practitioners, regardless of therapeutic 
orientation, have to communicate in more medicalized language when they interact 
with third-party payment systems or the broader psychiatric system and this can lead 
to an ambivalent relationship with diagnosis (Strong, Gaete, Sametband, French & 
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Eeson, 2012). Whereas there are traces of diagnostic and medicalizing language in 
some versions of narrative practice in psychiatry, there was a strong consensus 
amongst the PTMF project team about the need to avoid this as we sought to develop 
a conceptual alternative to diagnosis. 
 
It may be helpful to briefly summarize some of the other ways in which the use of 
narrative in the PTMF may differ from how it is used in different therapeutic 
traditions. 
 
• Narratives are not seen as inherently pathological and, consistent with 
continuum models, there is no sharp distinction between “normal” and 
“abnormal” experience 
• Narratives are not seen as just verbal and cognitive entities but are also viewed 
as embodied (e.g. through biological capacities and habit) 
• Narratives can be developed in a broad range of media and in a range of forms 
(i.e. not just in verbal, chronological linear forms) 
• Narratives developed in psychotherapy contexts are not privileged; rather, 
“therapeutic” narratives can be constructed in a range of contexts (including 
peer support groups and other forums where first person accounts and 
testimonies are witnessed, like activist communities etc)  
• Although people are seen as having agency, it is not assumed that people can 
easily re-author their narratives at will – what Smail (2004) refers to as 
“magical voluntarism” (Smail, 2004).  Rather, as Parker (1992, p.32) argues, 
“people ‘make’ discourse, but not in discursive conditions of their own 
choosing” 
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• Narratives are seen as shaped within interactions with others.  As a result it is 
important not to obscure the role of, for example, the diagnoser in diagnostic 
interviews (Georgaca, 2004) 
• Narratives are potentially colonizing of experience and thus the role of power 
and cultural availability need to be attended to (Russo & Beresford, 2015) 
• Research descriptions of narratives have been inappropriately used as a basis 
for prescriptions but they should not be used to enforce normative 
assumptions and scholars have rightly criticized prescriptive notions that life 
stories are or should be coherent (Hyvärinen, Hydén, Saarenheimo, & 
Tamboukou, 2010; McAdams, 2006).  Similarly, we must be careful not to 
imply pathology if narratives are not “integrated” or “insightful” and we 
should also be wary of the assumption that we all experience life narratively or 
that we must do this in order to have a well-lived life (Strawson, 2004). 
 
Because psychiatric diagnostic categories purport to be scientific constructs they are 
best judged by their reliability and validity, though they perform poorly against these 
standards (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018).  However, reliability is not the most appropriate 
evaluative criterion for personal therapeutic narratives because of the “highly 
contingent and synergistic nature of causality in human affairs … the multiplicity, 
complexity and interacting nature of the factors involved, and … our roles as meaning 
makers and active agents” (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018, p.250).  Instead, we might need 
to consider the level of fit between a narrative and our lived experience, accept that, 
within therapeutic settings, there might be both similarities and differences between 
how different therapists might develop a formulation with a client and acknowledge 
that, when constructing personal narratives, there is a difference between “historical 
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truth” and “narrative truth” Spence (1982). 
 
Within the PTMF, personal narratives are seen as shaped by culture which, in turn, is 
shaped by ideological power.  Our self-narratives are “what you can say you are 
according to what they say you can be” (Johnston, 1974, p.68). Ideological power is 
defined in the PTMF as involving: 
 
control of meaning, language and ‘agendas’, so that certain issues or groups 
may be held back from public scrutiny or people may be brought to see their 
interests and wants in particular ways. Ideological power also involves power 
to create beliefs or stereotypes about particular groups, to interpret your own 
or others’ experience, behaviour and feelings and have these meanings 
validated by others, and the power to silence or undermine. Johnstone and 
Boyle (2018, p.95) 
 
Lucy Johnstone’s article (this issue) explores how culture and power can be 
conceptualised as coming together in provisional patterns from which personal 
narratives may be derived.  The rest of this article will discuss the cultural narratives 
from which these personal narratives are constructed, focusing on how it is that 
certain narratives of problems in living become dominant in the wider culture whilst 
others are marginalized.  Medicalization will be used as an illustrative example 




The cultural availability of narratives in the public conversation about mental 
health 
People encounter ways of understanding problems in living in conversations with 
friends and family members, at school, college and places of worship, in the 
workplace and in varied forms of news and entertainment media, including 
advertizing and social media.  This public conversation includes discussion of books 
and research studies, reports by government bodies and thinktanks, and campaigns by 
advocacy organizations. 
 
In this public conversation, stories are framed in particular ways (Elwell-Sutton, 
Marshall, Bibby & Volmert, 2019) and, indeed, some of the actors in this 
conversation seek to promote particular frames.  A frame is a concept used within 
political science and in media and communications studies: 
 
[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.   Entman (1993, p.52)  
 
Media stories about distress and distressing conduct commonly draw on a medical 
frame (Hess, Decker, Lacasse & Foster, 2016; Leo & Lacasse, 2008) as do television 
dramas (Henderson, 2017).  They are framed as illnesses which, because they are seen 
as caused primarily by biological disease processes, require psychiatric interventions, 
primarily psychiatric drugs.  This is viewed as an inherently moral enterprize and it is 
assumed that a medical approach avoids attributions of personal moral blame.   
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Although the medical frame is now so taken for granted, it is important to remember 
that it only became dominant in Europe and North America in the mid-nineteenth 
century and only through the active and concerted efforts of medical practitioners and 
other advocates in the context of optimism based on some early successes in the 
medical field (Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013).  But, over 150 years later, 
medicalization remains a powerful cultural narrative.  How is this dominance 
maintained? 
 
Facilitating medicalization  
There is no single factor that can account for the continued dominance of medical 
explanations.  Rather, it is a complex process with a number of actors and influences 
(Rose, 2006, 2019).   
 
One major influence is the media and marketing campaigning engaged in by (often 
well-intentioned) advocates which sociologist Howard Becker termed “moral 
entrepreneurs”:  mental health charities, psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals.  Examples include the UK’s ‘Defeat depression’ campaign (Paykel, 
Tylee, Wright & Priest, 1997) and the Movement for Global Mental Health.   
 
A key player in such campaigns is the pharmaceutical industry.  It is in the interests of 
the industry’s shareholders to increase the number of potential consumers of its 
products by advocating: to have drugs prescribed for new problems; to lower the 
diagnostic thresholds of psychiatric disorders; and to broaden the boundaries of 
diagnosis – so-called “disease mongering”.  In addition, the industry seeks to shape 
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the public conversation through a medicalized frame via a variety of marketing 
strategies. Ben Goldacre, a British physician, academic and journalist devotes well 
over a quarter of his book Bad Pharma (Goldacre, 2012) to these:  
 
• Advertizing to both patients and doctors (often continuing to promote ideas 
like the serotonin hypothesis of depression long after the supporting research 
has been invalidated:  Lacasse & Leo, 2005) 
• Celebrity endorsements 
• The funding of apparently grassroots patient advocacy groups (so-called 
“astro-turfing”) 
• The employment of pharmaceutical sales representatives which accounts for 
half of the marketing budget of drugs companies.  According to Goldacre, 
there is approximately one representative for every six doctors and 17 of 29 
studies have found that doctors were more likely to prescribe a company’s 
drug after a representative’s visit 
• Academic “ghost authorship”: For example, a Danish study reported that 75-
91% of industry-funded drug trials showed evidence of this (Gøtzsche et al., 
2007) 
• Involvement in medical training (e.g. funding lectures, lunches etc) 
 
The well-documented financial ties between the industry and academia, publishing, 
the development of the DSM and even mental health charities cause significant 
conflicts of interest (Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015).  
 
Biomedically-oriented mental health campaigns have had some success in persuading 
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the public to adopt a biomedical view.  One US study reported that, between1996-
2006, public belief that depression was attributable to biological causes rose from 
77% to 88% whilst the proportion of respondents prioritizing medical interventions 
(seeing a doctor or psychiatrist or taking psychiatric drugs) rose from 48% to 60% 
(Blumner & Marcus, 2009).  Yet a belief in biomedical causation is associated with 
an increase not a decrease in stigma (Read & Harper, this issue). 
 
However, although Big Pharma is a major factor, as Rose (2006) notes, the general 
public, too, play their part in the dominance of medicalized narratives: 
 
Companies explore and chart the experienced discontents of individuals, link 
these with the promises held out by their drugs, and incorporate those into 
narratives that give those drugs meaning and value … In engaging with these 
images and narratives, in the hopes, anxieties and discontents they shape and 
foster, individuals play their own part in the medicalization of problems of 
living.      Rose (2006, p.480) 
 
In other words, companies choose which products to invest in and how to frame their 
marketing based on research into what we want and we then engage with these 
narratives by requesting psychiatric drugs when we visit physicians. 
 
We have focused here on medicalization but, although it is still the dominant media 
frame for understanding problems in living, narratives of psychotherapeutic culture  
and of psychologization (De Vos, 2012) are increasingly encountered due, in part, to 
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the moral entrepreneurship of psychologists and the therapy professions.  In the UK 
for example, the New Savoy Partnership (https://www.newsavoy 
partnership.org/declaration.htm) is an important advocacy group.  Indeed, Rose 
(2019) has argued that the PTMF itself may be an example of moral entrepreneurship, 
by seeking to replace psychiatric conceptualisations with more psychological 
constructs like threat responses.  Given the dominance of medicalization there seems 
little immediate danger of alternative frameworks like the PTMF becoming 
hegemonic, we need to remain vigilant since any alternative narrative frame has the 
potential both to become hegemonic and to colonize. 
 
So far we have seen that the public conversation is not a level playing field since 
some narratives are promoted by institutions with societal power and significant 
financial resources.  But there are also filters which may prevent some narratives 
being heard. 
 
Hallin’s spheres:  Media gatekeeping and filtering   
Hallin (1986) has argued that media organizations serve a filtering and gatekeeping 
function and he proposes that there are three spheres of public discourse.  The “sphere 
of consensus” is where certain ideas are assumed to be shared and are accepted as 
valid with journalists feeling no need to present an opposing viewpoint.  The “sphere 
of legitimate controversy” is where it is recognized there is a legitimate debate and 
opposing viewpoints are presented.  The “sphere or deviance” includes ideas seen by 
journalists as so outside the bounds of legitimate debate that they can be safely 
ignored or even ridiculed. 
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How might we apply this to media coverage of problems in living?  To some extent 
we will need to be speculative here as much of the research on media coverage of 
mental health is based on categories of content whilst research on framing in health 
(Elwell-Sutton et al., 2019) and mental health (Hess et al., 2016) is in its infancy. 
 
The default narrative frame in mental health is a medical one and opposing 
viewpoints are rarely presented, thus indicating it lies well within the “sphere of 
consensus”.  For example, a study of over a thousand articles on the BBC’s website 
between 1999-2008 found that mental health was ‘represented as being essentially 
neurobiological in origin’ since 75% of articles concerned ‘biological aspects of 
mental disorder – brain function, genetics, physical environment, nutrition, and 
pharmacological and other biological treatment’, whilst only 1% of stories focused on 
psychotherapies (Lewison, Roe, Wentworth & Szmukler, 2012, p.440).  Moreover, 
stories about biomedical research are frequently based on narratives of “genetic 
optimism” (Conrad, 2011; Wilde et al., 2011).  The wealth of research evidence 
which contradicts these narratives is rarely covered. 
 
Within the medical frame, distress and distressing conduct are explained and 
legitimized at the level of the individual without appearing to blame them, and the 
assumption that psychiatric drugs are effective means that, as Henderson argues, in 
relation to mental health storylines in television dramas, “medication provides a 
relatively simple on-screen solution to resolve complex stories” (2017, p.106). 
 
In the “sphere of legitimate debate” we might find stories concerning the need to 
remove barriers to accessing mental health services (Hess et al., 2016).  Where 
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psychosocial aetiological factors are covered (e.g. childhood abuse, poverty and 
inequality), these are presented as triggers of biological disorders (Hess et al., 2016) 
rather than as a challenge to biomedical aetiology.  As with media coverage of health 
problems the narrative frame focuses at the level of the individual thus ignoring 
psychosocial and structural causes (Elwell-Sutton et al., 2019). 
 
Lying on the borderline between Hallin’s spheres of “legitimate controversy” and 
“deviance” are the much less frequent stories about the problems of psychiatric drugs 
(e.g. over-prescription or the adverse unwanted effects referred to as ‘side effects’ 
etc).  There may be occasional stories about medicalization but these are often 
episodic (e.g. aligned with newsworthy moments like the publication of the DSM-5) 
and they have not prompted media organizations to routinely give space to alternative 
perspectives in everyday mental health coverage.  Moreover, the force of such stories 
may be undermined by presenting this simply as a “turf war” between psychologists 
and psychiatrists (e.g. Doward, 2013), drawing on the familiar media frame of a 
dispute between two rival interest groups (Sweeney, 2015).  Alternatively, stories 
may be framed in a manner likely to generate debate and so be “newsworthy”, for 
example whether or not a particular form of distress “exists” or whether those 
experiencing distress are just the “worried well”. 
 
Within the “sphere of deviance” lie all the ideas about problems in living which could 
be presented but are currently ignored, like the idea that the medical frame and its 
associated concepts are contested within the psy professions and, as Henderson 
(2017) notes, by many survivors.  Other things ignored include, for example: 
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• The very substantial empirical and conceptual research literature 
(summarized in the PTMF) highlighting the limitations of biomedical 
approaches  
• The alternative explanatory models suggested by researchers (including that 
distress and troubling conduct may be the legacy of socially-patterned 
adversities) and summarized in the PTMF 
• Discussion of ‘upstream’ public mental health primary prevention (as 
opposed to secondary prevention like ‘early intervention’ approaches) 
• The influence of the pharmaceutical industry in the construction of 
psychiatric knowledge and diagnostic manuals (Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015) 
• That some, though not all, service users/psychiatric survivors prefer a social 
model (Beresford, Nettle & Perring, 2010) 
• That a variety of explanatory models are available for understanding 
experiences like voices and visions within the Hearing Voices Movement 
(Corstens, Longden, McCarthy-Jones, Waddingham & Thomas, 2014) 
• That there is a debate amongst mental health professionals about explanatory 
models (e.g. Read et al., 2017) 
 
How these spheres operate can be illustrated by considering news coverage of  
homicides by people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  Stories within the sphere of 
consensus often simply report that the person experienced delusions and/or 
hallucinations and had stopped drug treatment.  Within the sphere of legitimate debate 
would be concerns about whether mental health services had acted adequately.  
However, other information that might render these actions meaningful (though 
obviously not in any way justified) currently lie within the sphere of deviance:  for 
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example, the content of the person’s beliefs and voices, the reasons why they had 
stopped taking the psychiatric drugs prescribed and so on. Since what makes such 
cases unusual (e.g. their unpredictability) is considered more newsworthy then this is 
given more prominence rather than the similarities they have with other homicides 
(i.e. that they are often committed by young men in the context of drug and alcohol 
abuse:  Hiday, 1995). 
 
Cultural availability, dominance and hermeneutical injustice 
A particularly useful concept in understanding the cultural availability of narratives is 
that of hermeneutical injustice which occurs “when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of 
their social experience” (Fricker, 2007, p.1). If, for example, you hear voices but have 
only encountered the notion this is a symptom of schizophrenia and never heard that it 
could be a dissociative threat response associated with trauma like childhood sexual 
abuse, then we might consider that you had experienced hermeneutical injustice.  A 
more epistemically just situation would be one where the wider culture makes 
available to us a range of different explanatory narratives and information on their 
respective costs and benefits. 
 
The injustice of the situation is worsened if the only narratives you have access to 
have significant limitations.  Thus, whilst a medical approach to physical health has 
been largely successful, the same cannot be said of its application to distress and 
distressing conduct.  Psychiatric narratives have a number of problematic 
characteristics:  they are deficit-focused (Gergen, 1990); they tend to locate the causes 
of problems (and thus imply solutions also lie) primarily in a simplistic and reductive 
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interpretation of biology and the brain; they can obscure the personal and social 
context and erase human agency; and, although at face value they do not appear to 
blame the individual, they are strongly associated with prejudice from others and the 
desire for social distance (Read & Harper, this issue). Moreover, although the 
purported benefits of a medical framework are commonly presented, its potential 
costs are much less frequently presented, as studies regularly reveal. For example, 
Billcliff, McCabe and Brown (2001) interviewed 68 long-term psychiatric inpatients 
in Scotland in the UK and found that 81% did not know any of the adverse and 
unwanted effects of psychiatric drugs and few realized that they had any choice in 
whether to take them. 
 
Implications for therapists and other mental health professionals 
Mental health professionals not only have a gatekeeping role in relation to accessing 
mental health services but they are also gatekeepers to the narratives on which people 
draw to understand problems in living.  Currently, many professionals tend to 
explicitly or implicitly promote their preferred explanatory models, which appear to 
vary by professional training (Read et al., 2017).  One option, therefore, might be to 
develop skills in curating a range of narratives which might explain or give meaning 
to these problems. Open Dialogue therapists (e.g. Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006), 
influenced by the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, have shown how therapists might 
facilitate such pluralistic dialogues in people’s social networks.  Research indicates 
that people seem able to move between different narrative frames and so this process 
could involve developing idiosyncratic blendings and ways of synchronizing and co-
ordinating different narrative frames.  
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However, as this article has discussed, currently, medicalizing narratives have much 
more power than alternative narratives.  Can medical narratives like psychiatric 
diagnosis simply be seen as just another narrative when their contested scientific 
status and potential limitations and costs have been obscured, when some categories 
are experienced as deeply stigmatizing, when people have not been given equal access 
to other narratives and when rejection of a medical narrative may result in being seen 
as “lacking insight” and even being detained and given psychiatric drugs without 
one’s consent?   
 
Given the power of the medical frame, most professionals are in a position where 
their clients have been diagnosed by others or may have diagnosed themselves and 
this poses a number of dilemmas for therapists (Strong et al., 2012). Sutherland et al 
(2016) propose that therapists could enhance their reflexivity by drawing on 
discursive methods to notice when they are engaging in individualizing, medicalizing 
and pathologizing kinds of talk and to identify opportunities to engage in more 
socially contextualizing conversations.  They suggest some types of questions which 
might support such conversations and the PTMF (e.g. its Provisional General Patterns 
– Johnstone, this issue) might also be a valuable conceptual resource in this 
endeavour.  Such practices could be used in supervisory contexts (e.g. peer-
supervision).  
 
Many therapists’ clients may be prescribed psychiatric drugs and, given the way in 
which their use is portrayed in culture as a treatment of an underlying biological 
disorder, therapists could inform themselves of alternative conceptualisations.  For 
example, as Yeomans, Moncrieff and Huws (2015) suggest, one can use psychiatric 
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drugs within a non-diagnostic framework for “symptomatic relief” without needing to 
accept biomedical causal models, adopting a “drug-centered” rather than a “disease-
centered” approach (the implications of this are discussed in Johnstone and Boyle, 
2018 pp.304-306).  In addition, the late Michael White (1995) has suggested that 
therapists could ask questions aimed at assisting their clients to: 
 
• Fully inform themselves about the various adverse effects of psychiatric drugs. 
• Monitor the effects of different drugs, and of different levels of these drugs. 
• Establish criteria to evaluate the effects of psychiatric drugs.  For example, to 
what extent do they contribute to, or subtract from, their quality of life?  What 
effects do they have on their relationships?   
• Identify which people are most and which least invested in compliance with 
regimes of psychiatric drug prescriptions, and the particular interests of these 
parties. 
 
Given the implicit preference for individual therapy amongst many therapists, we 
need to bear in mind that the support it offers may be limited and that some kinds of 
solidarity can only found in collectives where we can learn from others (e.g. in peer 
groups; see SHIFT Recovery Community – this issue) and where the effects of others 
witnessing and validating our stories can be powerful as seen in Hearing Voices 
Movement peer groups and Collective Narrative practices (Denborough, 2018). 
Therapists could inform themselves and clients about such networks and support their 
development as allies.  Such initiatives are also more likely to facilitate social action, 
taking us beyond more individualized notions of recovery.  
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Although such developments in therapeutic practice are likely to be beneficial, any 
change is likely to be assimilated or negated unless there is a change in the broader 
culture since it is, as we have seen, still dominated by medicalization.   
 
 
Re-balancing the public conversation  
Since the public conversation about mental health is unbalanced by the dominance of 
a medical frame, it needs to be re-balanced, and this will require concerted action 
from new social movements comprized of users and survivors of psychiatry, allies 
from the mental health and psychotherapy professions, and the wider public.  Since 
these groups include people with a range of viewpoints, presenting an alternative 
approach like the PTMF can raise questions and concerns for those who believe that 
psychiatric diagnosis legitimizes distress and provides access to information, services, 
welfare and support.  These issues can only be resolved through further discussion of 
the alternative ways in which these apparent functions of diagnosis can be fulfilled, 
which we outline in the final chapter of the main PTMF document (Johnstone & 
Boyle, 2018) and elsewhere (e.g. Johnstone et al., 2019). 
 
Such new social movements need to develop strategies and tactics to consistently 
challenge media organizations so that currently marginalized narratives move from 
Hallin’s sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate debate and narratives from that 
sphere move to the sphere of consensus.  Such campaigns would need to anticipate 
how those promoting a medical narrative will respond with counter-frames like 
viewing psychosocial adversity as simply a “trigger” of mental illness.  Common 
media frames found in coverage of other topics could be utilized, like the importance 
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of human rights including access to information and choice and the need to hear the 
user/survivor’s voice not simply that of professionals. Useful metaphors could also be 
mobilized, for example the need to have a pluralistic and democratic dialogue rather 
than a (psychiatric or psychological) monologue (Hart, 2018; Watts, 2018).  A recent 
and increasingly popular slogan which expresses the link between problems in living 
and adversities is ‘Instead of asking what’s wrong with me, ask what has happened to 
me’.   
 
This is now more possible than ever as the traditional gatekeeping role of media 
organizations and the privileged status they have given to psychiatric expertise is 
increasingly being challenged by the internet and social media (Shullenberger, 2017) 
although this also means it can be easy for alternative frames to be drowned out. Such 
campaigns need to find ways of cutting through this noise, extending this debate 
beyond traditional mental health circles, finding broader constituencies of support as 
with large-scale public campaigns against the over-prescription of benzodiazepines in 
the UK in the 1980s.  For example, a recent UK campaign highlighting the difficulties 
in withdrawing from “anti-depressant” drugs (Rhodes, 2019) offers the possibility for 
further involvement of the public given the extensive prescription of these drugs 
internationally.  And we also need to remember the important role that can be played 
by the arts and entertainment media in broadening the conversation. 
 
Imagine what could be done by well-supported organizations which could critique the 
claims of research studies, offer well-evidenced alternative interpretations and 
persuade media organizations to adopt a more pluralistic editorial approach1.  Imagine 
 
1 Some of the ideas presented here were first developed in conversations with Jacqui Dillon. 
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how such organizations and their supporters could facilitate the development of 
content based on alternative frames through online resources, building a network of 
media contacts and running workshops for authors (e.g. mental health users and 
survivors, friends, family members and allies).  Imagine if they could be active across 
social media platforms (e.g. YouTube, Twitter, Instagram etc) perhaps combining 
concise critiques and alternative framings with irony and humor.   
In conclusion, it should be noted that this article has largely focused on the public 
conversation, primarily the media.  There is a need for further research both 
documenting biomedical dominance and identifying how alternative frames can be 
introduced.  Researchers could also investigate other domains of discourse, like the 
priorities of research funding bodies, professional trainings, textbooks and so on.  
Only through continued and concerted action will we increase the availability in 
wider culture of alternative conceptualisations of problems in living and so address 
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